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395 
FILLING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL GAP:  
“REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF 
BUSINESS” AFTER IN RE CRAY, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the nineteenth century, specific venue rules for patent infringement 
suits have existed in federal law.1 The current version of the “Patent Venue 
Statute” is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which provides that “[a]ny civil 
action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where 
the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”2 Over 
time, the reach of this statute has changed in relation to where a corporation 
“resides”3 in the specific context of the statute. These changes have come 
when courts interpret the relationship between the Patent Venue Statute and 
amendments to the “General Venue Statute.”4 In TC Heartland, LLC v. 
Kraft Goods Grp. Brands, LLC,5 the Supreme Court yet again changed our 
understanding of the relationship between the General Venue Statute and 
the Patent Venue Statute, upending over thirty years of precedent by holding 
that the narrower Patent Venue Statute jurisprudence, not the General 
Venue Statute, determines the meaning of the word “resides.”6 However, 
the TC Heartland Court provided no guidance on how to apply the second 
portion of this once-extinct rule of civil procedure. This Note aims to 
provide some of that missing guidance necessary to determine which 
precedent remains good law, which case law has been expressly or 
implicitly overruled, and how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(Federal Circuit) and federal district courts are likely to rule in novel factual 
situations moving forward.7 
The determinative issue in the vast majority of patent venue decisions is 
whether the defendant has a “regular and established place of business”8 in 
the federal judicial district where a plaintiff brings suit. Venue is important 
to litigants because the local rules of each district court can vary drastically, 
                                                 
1. Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 [hereinafter 1897 Act]. 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
3. Id. 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391; see also infra Section I.B (providing a discussion of the history leading 
up to the current version of the statute). 
5. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
6. Id. at 1517. 
7. See infra Part IV. 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
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and these rules influence the length of the proceeding, the jury pool, the cost 
of litigation, and the likelihood of success.9 
In In re Cray, Inc.,10 the Federal Circuit articulated a new legal test for 
applying the Patent Venue Statute to different factual scenarios to answer 
whether there is a regular and established place of business in a plaintiff’s 
desired judicial district. In Cray, a defendant’s sales employee conducted 
some business activities from his home in the Eastern District of Texas.11 In 
holding that there was no regular and established place of business—thereby 
making venue improper—the Federal Circuit recited three elements 
necessary to satisfy the regular and established place of business 
requirement: (1) there must be a “fixed, physical location,” (2) the location 
must be a “regular and established place of business,” and (3) the location 
must be “of the defendant.”12 These requirements overruled the four-factor 
test Judge Gilstrap articulated in the proceeding below in the Eastern 
District of Texas.13 Since the alleged facts did not establish that the 
defendant had any ownership or possessory interest in the employee’s 
residence, the physical location in the district did not belong to the 
defendant, and the third requirement was not met.14 
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the Patent 
Venue Statute is consistent with Congress’s original purpose for enacting it, 
which was to narrow the scope of venue when compared to general venue 
requirements.15 Where Cray conflicts with prior case law, it conflicts only 
to the extent that there was already a conflict in the precedent with this 
original purpose. And in most decisions after Cray, district courts have 
resolved the conflict on the side of a narrower reading that would find venue 
improper.16 In other words, federal district court cases applying Cray’s legal 
test have similarly erred on the side of a narrow reading.17 Even though there 
will surely be much more case law on this topic, Cray provides a roadmap 
for the factual scenarios likely to trigger a venue challenge worth litigating, 
and thus require a court’s analysis. 
                                                 
9. See Joseph E. Cwik, Local Patent Rules and Their Impact on Litigation, 2012 WL 1670113, 
at *1 (“Courts adopt these local patent rules to streamline patent cases by closely regulating the litigation 
conduct of the parties.”); Raymond L. Panneton, Don’t Feed the Troll: Curbing Patent Litigation in the 
Eastern District of Texas, 55 HOUS. LAW. 24, 25 (2017); J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for 
Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 634 (2015) (“[F]orum shopping in patent law is driven, at least 
in part, by federal district courts competing for litigants. This competition occurs primarily through 
procedural and administrative differentiation among courts.”). 
10. 871 F.3d 1355 (2017). 
11. Id. at 1358. 
12. Id. at 1360–62. 
13. See infra Section III.B. 
14. In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
15. See infra Section I.B. 
16. See discussion infra Sections III.C, Part IV. 
17. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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In this Note, Part I looks at the legislative histories of the Patent Venue 
Statute, the General Venue Statute, and the judicial understanding of their 
relationship over time. Part II looks at how the phrase “regular and 
established place of business” in the Patent Venue Statute has been 
interpreted in case law from its inception up to the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Cray, including competing theories among district courts. Part III 
explores Cray’s factual scenario, procedural history, interpretation of case 
law, reasoning, and the new test to be applied by district courts to determine 
proper venue. Finally, Part IV expands Cray’s rationale to the various 
factual scenarios and legal doctrines developed to handle these venue 
questions from Part II, then analyzes the decisions of district courts applying 
Cray’s test. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES OF THE VENUE STATUTES 
Where a defendant “resides” in patent infringement suits has changed 
based upon the Patent Venue Statute, the language of the General Venue 
Statute, and the relationship between the two as determined by the courts. 
These changes in interpretation explain both what policy reasons led to a 
Patent Venue Statute and why there has been a large gap in jurisprudence 
regarding the meaning of § 1400(b). Thus, before exploring the 
development of the interpretations of “regular and established place of 
business,”18 it is necessary to review the legislative history and 
jurisprudence that led up to TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Goods Grp. Brands, 
LLC.19 This involves a look at the developments of the Patent Venue 
Statute,20 the General Venue Statute.21 and the case law interpreting the 
relationship between the various versions of each.22 Section A examines the 
Patent Venue Statute from its original enactment in 189723 and two 
subsequent amendments. Section B traces the development of the General 
Venue Statute through its two amendments. Finally, Section C explores the 
evolving relationship between these statutes as understood by the courts. 
A. Patent Venue Statute 
Initially, the generally applicable provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
governed venue in patent infringement suits.24 Since then, there have been 
                                                 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
19. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
20. See infra Section I.A. 
21. See infra Section I.B. 
22. See infra Section I.C. 
23. 1897 Act. 
24. See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1518; see also infra note 25. 
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three versions of the Patent Venue Statute: (1) the original enactment in 
1897, (2) the codification in 1911, and (3) the codification in 1948. 
1. 1897 Original Enactment 
In a move from judicial25 to legislative venue rules, Congress enacted the 
original Patent Venue statute in 1897, which provided, 
[I]n suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the circuit 
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, 
in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district 
in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, 
shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular place 
of business. If such suit is brought in a district of which the defendant 
is not an inhabitant, but in which such defendant has a regular and 
established place of business, service of process, summons, or 
subpoena upon the defendant may be made by service upon the agent 
or agents engaged in conducting such business in the district in which 
suit is brought.26 
Congress sought to “narrow venue”27 options to certain judicial districts and 
thereby reduce “abuses”28 resulting from an overly broad venue rule. The 
first sentence quoted above provides two different requirements that can be 
met for venue to be proper.29 The first way to establish proper venue was to 
be in “the district of [where] the defendant is an inhabitant.”30 This was only 
one district at most. By contrast, the second way of establishing venue was 
in “any district in which the defendant . . . shall have committed acts of 
infringement and have a regular and established place of business.”31 This 
                                                 
25. In cases of patent infringements suits before 1897, suits were brought “in any district in which 
jurisdiction of defendant could be obtained.” See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 
430, 434 (1932). This rule was derived from previous cases holding that, since patent law was subject 
to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the “general provisions regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
United States, concurrent with that of the several states” was not applicable. In re Keasby & Mattison 
Co., 160 U.S. 221, 230 (1895). 
26. 1897 Act, at 695 (emphasis added). 
27. Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966). 
28. Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942). 
29. 1897 Act, at 695. 
30. Id. (emphasis added). 
31. Id. (emphasis added). This Note will not explore the requirements for what constitutes “acts 
of infringement” because this required is easily met by merely alleging infringing acts in the judicial 
district. See Symbology Innovations, LLC v. Lego Sys., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 916, 936 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(“[A] complaint’s well-pled factual allegation of infringement may satisfy this requirement regardless 
of this type of factual dispute.”) (citing Funnelcap, Inc. v. Orion Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 938, 943 (D. 
Del. 1975)). On a similar note, this requirement is not limiting because there is no requirement for a 
causal nexus to exist between the alleged acts of infringement and the regular and established place of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/4
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could be more than one district. The former was more restrictive than the 
General Venue Statute of the time, which merely required that the venue 
had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.32 
2. 1911 Codification 
In 1911, Congress amended its original Patent Venue Statute when they 
reauthorized and added it to the Judicial Code of 1911.33 The statute 
remained largely unchanged. In going from the original 1897 statute to the 
1911 version, the term “circuit courts” is replaced by the term “district 
courts.”34 This was not a substantive change.35 
3. 1948 Codification 
At the inception of the United States Code, Congress split up the first 
section of the statute, enumerating where venue is proper, with the second 
section, enumerating the procedures for proper service of process. Under 
the 1948 codification, the first section was changed to its present form. This 
statute provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be 
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”36 From the 1911 codification to the 1948 
codification, the word “resident”37 and its conjugates replaced the term 
“inhabitant”38 and its conjugates.39 
There is a similar word substitution in the second section covering 
service of process, which provides, “[i]n a patent infringement action 
commenced in a district where the defendant is not a resident but has a 
regular and established place of business, service of process, summons or 
subpoena upon such defendant may be made upon his agent or agents 
conducting such business.”40 This enumeration shows that an agency 
relationship can exist to tie a defendant to a plaintiff’s desired venue. 
                                                 
business. See Plexxikon Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 17-CV-04405-HSG, 2017 WL 6389674, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2017) (“[T]he plain language of the statute does not include a nexus requirement.”). 
32. See infra Section I.B. 
33. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 48, 36 Stat. 1087, 1100 [hereinafter 1911 Judicial Code]. 
34. Id. 
35. See W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Sayler Wire Co., 236 U.S. 723, 724 (1915). 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
37. Id. 
38. 1911 Judicial Code, at 1100. 
39. This was explicitly directed not to constitute a substantive change. See The Reviser’s Note 
to 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (Supp. II 1949) (clarifying that “inhabitant” and “resident” are “synonymous” for 
the purposes of venue). 
40. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1694, 62 Stat. 945 [hereinafter 1948 Act]. This section of 
the text is also in its current form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (2017). 
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B. General Venue Statute 
1. 1948 Codification 
When the original Patent Venue Statute was enacted in 1897, there was 
no reason to think the general rules of venue would modify it, nor was there 
one during the 1911 codification. That changed when the General Venue 
Statute was passed as part of the 1948 codification that provided, in relevant 
part, 
§ 1391. Venue Generally 
. . . 
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such 
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation 
for venue purposes.41 
The heading “Venue Generally”42 created confusion among the courts about 
whether these rules affected the Patent Venue Statute.43 Specifically, courts 
were unsure of whether the general definition of residence under § 1391(c) 
altered the definition of residence under § 1400(b).44 
2. 1988 and 2011 Amendments 
In 1988, the phrase “for venue purposes”45 was removed from the end of 
§ 1391(c) of the General Venue Statute and was replaced with the 
introductory clause, “[f]or the purposes of venue under this chapter.”46 And 
again in 2011, the statute was reworded such that the clause defining the 
scope of applicability was changed. Both changes reignited debate on its 
applicability to the Patent Venue Statute.47 With this amendment, the entire 
chapter was rewritten and the phrase the scope of applicability was, and 
currently is, provided as, 
(A) APPLICABILITY OF SECTION.--Except as otherwise provided by 
                                                 
41. 1948 Act, at 935 (emphasis added). 
42. Id. 
43. See Stonite, 315 U.S. at 564 (observing that “the lower federal courts became uncertain as to 
the applicability” of general venue rules to patent infringement proceedings). 
44. See infra Section II.C.1. 
45. 1948 Act, at 935. 
46. Act of Nov. 29, 1988, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 [hereinafter 1988 Act]. “[T]his 
chapter” refers to chapter 87 of title 28 in the United States Code, entitled “District Courts; Venue.” Id. 
at 4664. 
47. See discussion infra Sections I.C.2–.3. 
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law-- 
(1) this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought in 
district courts of the United States.48 
Not only is this scope language present in the beginning of § 1391(a), 
subsection (c) contains similarly all-encompassing language, providing 
(C) RESIDENCY.--For all venue purposes— 
. . . 
(2) an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name 
under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed 
to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such 
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect 
to the civil action in question and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial 
district in which it maintains its principal place of business.49 
C. Relationship Between the General and Patent Venue Statutes 
From the 1948 codification of the General Venue Statute to the present, 
there has been no amendment to the text of the Patent Venue Statute. Thus, 
evaluations of the relationship between these two venue statutes arised from 
the enactment of the three versions of the General Venue Statute. 
1. Original 1948 Statute and Fourco 
The 1948 General Venue Statute defined the term resident “for all venue 
purposes.”50 Circuit courts initially split on whether use of the word “all”51 
meant that the definition of residency in the Patent Venue Statute was 
affected. In 1957, in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,52 the 
Supreme Court held that the general statute had no effect on the specific 
statute. The Court relied on its holding in Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Co.53 
that the “purpose” of the Patent Venue Statute was “not only to define the 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts not now defined, but also limit that 
jurisdiction and so clearly define it that in the future there will be no 
question with regard to the application of [general venue acts].”54 Since 
“dovetail[ing]” the general provisions would have broadened venue 
                                                 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (emphasis added). 
49. Id. § 1391(c) (emphasis added). 
50. 1948 Act, at 395.  
51. Id. 
52. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
53. 315 U.S. 561 (1942). 
54. Id. at 565 n.5 (citing 29 CONG. REC 1900–01 (1897) (statement of Rep. Mitchell)). 
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possibilities, this was held to run contrary to the intent of the Patent Venue 
Statute, and therefore the general statute was rendered inapplicable.55 Thus, 
the Patent Venue Statute was the “exclusive provision controlling venue in 
patent infringement proceedings.”56 
2. 1988 Amendment and VE Holding 
After Congress reworded the scope of the word residence as “[f]or all 
venue purposes under this chapter” in 1988,57 the Federal Circuit revisited 
the General Venue Statute’s applicability in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson 
Gas Appliance Co.58 to decide if there was a material change with the new 
language. This time, the Federal Circuit held that the “meaning of the term 
‘resides’ in § 1400(b) has changed”59 and was now altered by the definition 
in § 1391(c).60 The VE Holding court emphasized that the term “this 
chapter”61 was newly added, and because the Patent Venue Statute fell 
under the relevant chapter in title 28, the general definition applied.62 This 
issue of applicability never reached the Supreme Court before the 2011 
amendment.63 
3. 2011 Amendment and TC Heartland 
More than a quarter century after VE Holding, the Supreme Court 
returned to the question of whether the General Venue Statute applied to 
Patent Venue Statute for the first time since Fourco in its TC Heartland 
decision.64 In a ten-page opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that 
Fourco was still good law, that Congress did not ratify VE Holding with the 
2011 Amendment, and that the General Venue Statute does not broaden the 
definition of residence in the Patent Venue Statute.65 Therefore, “a domestic 
                                                 
55. Fourco, 353 U.S. at 225. 
56. Id. (citing Stonite, 315 U.S. at 563). 
57. 1988 Act, at 4669. 
58. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
59. Id. at 1575. 
60. Id. 
61. 1988 Act, at 4669. 
62. VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1578. 
63. See, e.g., Johnson Gas Appliance Co. v. VE Holding Corp., 499 U.S. 922 (1991) (ordering 
the denial of petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court). 
64. 137 S. Ct. at 1516. The Court was addressing the statute after the 2011 amendments. 
However, because it held that Fourco was still good law, the Court made no distinction between the 
1948 codification, the 1988 amendment version, or the current version after the 2011 amendment with 
respect to the applicability to the Patent Venue Statute. Id.  
65. Id. at 1517. The Court reasoned that the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” in 
section 1391 meant that their ruling in Fourco explicitly provided for such an exception. Id. 
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corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the 
Patent Venue Statute.”66 
II. “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE OF BUSINESS” JURISPRUDENCE 
BEFORE CRAY 
Between the VE Holding decision in 1990 and the TC Heartland decision 
in 2017, there were very few cases claiming proper venue under the second 
prong of § 1400(b) in that period.67 With this gap in case law, district courts 
and the Federal Circuit only had decades-old precedent to interpret this 
statute. Specifically, district courts and the Federal Circuit after TC 
Heartland were left no guidance in interpreting the once-obsolete phrase 
“regular and established place of business.”68 
Part III introduces the case law leading up to Cray. Whether there is a 
“regular and established place of business”69 in the chosen venue is a 
question of law that relies on factual inquiries.70 Although business practices 
vary from case to case, Donald S. Chisum explains in his treatise on patents 
that nearly every patent venue case’s fact pattern can be grouped into one 
of four categories: the “Independent Sales Representative,” the “Traveling 
Salesman,” the “Sales Office,” and the “Subsidiary Corporations.”71 Each 
of these case patterns illuminates which facts courts found important when 
deciding if venue has been established.72 
A. The Independent Sales Representative 
In the “Independent Sales Representative” line of cases, an individual 
solicits sales with the district for a corporation in districts outside of that 
company’s corporate residence, and the representative does not have a fixed 
location.73 Faced with this set of facts, courts have generally concluded that 
contacts are too limited and therefore insufficient to meet the venue 
                                                 
66. Id. at 1514. 
67. Before Cray was decided in late 2017, the last time the Federal Circuit examined the “regular 
and established place of business” requirement was thirty-two years earlier in In re Cordis Corp., 769 
F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This gap was created because the broader definition of General Venue 
Statute’s broader definition of residence makes it co-extensive with personal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c). Since every patent infringement requires personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), establishing venue through the residency requirement imposed no additional 
limitation, and rendered the second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) effectively moot. 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
69. Id. 
70. See Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (explaining that “each case depends on its own facts”). 
71. 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[2][d] (Matthew Bender ed., 2011). 
72. Id. at § 21.02[2][d]. 
73. Id. at § 21.02[2][d][iii]. 
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requirement.74 With regard to the salesman, courts have only cared about 
physical locations where business is conducted, but not the personal 
residence of any given employee.75 
B. The Traveling Salesman 
In a typical “Traveling Salesman” case, a defendant company’s only 
business contact with the district is through a salesman with a formal 
relationship to an out-of-district company who seeks out deals that are 
forwarded to the defendant’s primary office located outside the relevant 
district for completion.76 If this salesman does not live in the district, there 
can be no place of business and venue is improper.77 There was a gray area, 
however, when the salesman lives in the district. Until 1973, venue was 
considered improper even with a physical residence in the district of the 
salesman.78 But in a change of direction, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio in Shelter-Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc. began a trend 
shifted away from this strict, bright-line rule and held that venue was proper 
where a traveling salesmen lives in a judicial district when business is being 
performed from that residence.79 Judge Green explained in Shelter-Lite that, 
[A]n unyielding rule that a regular and established place of business 
cannot arise by virtue of a salesman operating out of his residence is 
at odds with the practicalities and necessities of the business 
community. In many instances, by reason of the type of product 
                                                 
74. See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nopco Chem. Co., 388 F.2d 818, 820 (4th Cir. 1968) (holding 
that the regional sales manager doing business across ten states does not qualify as a regular and 
established place of business, even though the defendant lives within the district in which suit was 
brought). 
75. See, e.g., Eiger Mach., Inc. v. Premier Mill Corp., 228 U.S.P.Q. 51, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(“[T]he presence of an independent sales representative paid on a commission basis who happens to 
have an office in a particular jurisdiction does not represent a regular and established place of business 
for a defendant.”) (citing Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420 F.2d 1182, 1184–85 (7th Cir. 
1969); Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 1385 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
76. See Fruit Indus. v. Metro Glass Bottle Co., 18 F. Supp. 489, 492 (D.N.J. 1937); CHISUM, 
supra note 67, § 21.02[2][d][i]. 
77. See, e.g., IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp. (Whaledent Int’l Div.) v. Les Fils D’Auguste Maillefer 
S.A., 446 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“STAR does not own, lease or control any place of 
business or ‘physical location’ within the Southern District of New York. Because STAR does not have 
a ‘regular and established place of business’ within the Southern District of New York, the second basis 
for patent venue is not satisfied.”); Candas v. Agnini, 14 F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (holding that 
the traveling salesman’s home office was in Illinois even though the suit was brought in New York). 
78. E.g., Univ. of Ill. Found. v. Channel Master Corp., 382 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1967) 
(determining that a sales representative operating from an office and being reimbursed phone, car and 
postage expenses did not have a regular and established place of business); Silicon Tech., Inc. v. United 
Refractories, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1, 2 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (“Where a corporation employs sales 
representatives within a district without owning, leasing, or controlling any real property within the 
district, as here, courts have been reluctant to find a regular and established place of business.”). 
79. 356 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 
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involved, there is simply no need for a sales representative to 
maintain a formal office, nor for the employers to maintain 
warehousing facilities in a particular locale. When the salesman 
spends virtually all his time on the road calling on customers, selling 
a product which, by reason of its bulk or specialized nature, can only 
be demonstrated through the use of small samples and supporting 
technical data, and such product is shipped directly to the customer 
upon completion of manufacture, the maintenance of an office, in the 
traditional sense, would be economically unsound.80 
Other districts courts followed Judge Green’s lead and began finding a 
“regular and established place of business”81 in these types of traveling 
salesman cases.82 
C. The Sales Office 
In the “Sales Office” scenario, a physical location in the district is 
present, but the relationship of that location to the defendant is suspect. In 
W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Sayler Wire Co.,83 the Supreme Court created 
uncertainty when it decided that an office used exclusively for solicitation 
and forwarding of sales orders to an office outside of the district would not 
constitute a regular and established place of business.84 The Court stated 
that Tyler did not present such a finding, but it gave little to no guidance 
regarding which fact(s) was dispositive for meeting § 1400(b)’s “regular 
and establish place of business” requirement.85 The four significant facts, as 
understood by later courts presented with this issue, were that (1) the 
salesman operating out of the office had no authority to accept orders, (2) a 
single infringement was generated by the office, (3) the salesman 
                                                 
80. Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 
82. E.g., CPG Prod. Corp. v. Mego Corp., 214 U.S.P.Q. 129, 132 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (“[T]he fact 
that the agent does not perform these activities from one set physical location such as a storefront or a 
rented office space should not control the question of whether his employer has established a regular 
place of business there.”); Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs., Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 684, 
689–90 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (“We find it hard to believe that ‘a regular and established place of business’ is 
to be read so narrowly as to require some fixed physical location which can be said to be the regular and 
established place of business contemplated by § 1400(b).”). 
83. 236 U.S. 723 (1915). 
84. Id. at 724. 
85. Id. at 725 (“The circumstances attending only one sale appear in the record, and this was 
negotiated by the purchaser in order that it might afford the basis for a suit. Guerin received and 
forwarded, and his principal accepted, the order for goods, which were thereafter manufactured and 
shipped by express to the purchaser in New York city. This sale was consummated at St. Louis, and did 
not constitute an infringement of appellant’s patent within the district where suit was brought.”) (citing 
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Elec. Mfg. Co., 116 F. 641 (1902)). 
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represented both the defendant and another company, and (4) the expenses 
of the office were shared between the two companies.86 
After Tyler, several lower court opinions focused on the first requirement 
that lacking authority to bind the defendant to a sales agreement.87 Without 
such authority, these offices were held not to be a regular and established 
place of business. Another line of cases after Tyler, by contrast, followed a 
more flexible approach to the decision.88 These cases tend to focus on the 
third fact—that the physical office space or the sales representative is shared 
with another company89—and fourth fact—when the sales representative 
pays for the expenses90—in finding there is no place of business. Moreover, 
other business activities besides sales conducted at the sales office can turn 
it into a regular place for the purposes of § 1400(b).91 
D. The Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 
A case will fall under the “Parent and Subsidiary Corporations” category 
when a defendant corporation does not have a regular and established place 
of business in a district, but does have a subsidiary that has a place of regular 
and established place of business in the district.92 While this generally will 
                                                 
86. CHISUM, supra note 67, § 21.02[2][d][ii]. 
87. See, e.g., Gen. Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 951 (1st Cir. 1961) (finding 
no regular and established place of business where “the local salesman consummated no sales himself; 
his only duty with respect to sales was ‘to solicit orders [and] forward them when received to the home 
office for execution.’”); Endrezze v. Dorr Co., 97 F.2d 46, 48 (9th Cir. 1938) (finding no regular and 
established place of business where five salaried employees had no authority to bind, there was no 
warehouse in the district, and all shipping was directed at the head office outside of the district). 
88. See Shelton v. Schwartz, 131 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1942) (“It is sufficient to observe that 
a ‘regular and established place of business’ may be found to exist, though the court does not know 
whether the business conducted therein was soliciting, or soliciting and selling. Emphasis must be on 
the existence of the regular and established place of business,—not on the nature or character of the 
business conducted there.”). 
89. See A. O. Smith-Inland, Inc. v. Hoeganaes Corp., 407 F. Supp. 539, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1976) 
(failing to find a regular and established place of business because the sales engineer sent to trade shows 
also worked for other companies in the same metals industry). 
90. See, e.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 571, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) 
(finding no regular and established place of business where sales representative worked on commission 
and was not reimbursed for expenses while in New York); Erickson v. Emerson, 40 F. Supp. 844, 845 
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (finding no regular and established place of business because the independent 
contractor within the district “paid his own expenses and costs of doing business, and [defendant] was 
without any obligation and responsibility in respect thereto.”). 
91. E.g., William Sklaroff Design Assocs., Inc. v. Metcor Mfg., Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 769, 772 
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding a regular and established place of business where defendant’s products are 
“continually on display in a showroom that is open to visitors” in a space in the district paid for by them); 
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Eltra Corp., 538 F. Supp. 700, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (servicing of electronic 
products sufficient for a finding of a regular and established place of business). 
92. CHISUM, supra note 67, § 21.02[2][d][iv]. This is true even for wholly-owned subsidiaries if 
the formalities of separate existence are adhered to. See L. D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Clearfield Cheese 
Co., 495 F. Supp. 313, 318 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (“[T]he mere existence of a wholly-owned subsidiary in a 
judicial district does not, by itself, suffice to establish venue over the subsidiary’s parent corporation.”). 
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not meet § 1400(b) requirements, there is an exception to this rule when the 
parent company uses the subsidiary as its agent.93 This agency relationship 
is created either when (1) the parent disregards the corporate formalities,94 
or (2) when there is an inseparable connection between the business 
operations, property, and financing of the two companies.95 
III. IN RE CRAY, INC. 
With this legislative history and case law regarding what a “regular and 
established place of business” is, the Federal Circuit revisited this question 
for the first time in over thirty years in In re Cray, Inc.96 Section A 
summarizes the factual background of the case. Section B looks at the 
overturned district court decision. Section C looks at the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation and analysis of the statutory language and application of that 
interpretation to the facts of the case. Finally, Section D summarizes the 
early applications of Cray at the district court level. 
A. Factual Background 
Defendant Cray, Inc. (Cray) is a seller of supercomputers incorporated 
and having its principal place of business in the state of Washington.97 
Plaintiff Raytheon Co. (Raytheon) is a military equipment manufacturer that 
brought suit against Cray for patent infringement in the Eastern District of 
Texas.98 To establish proper venue, Raytheon argued that the residence of a 
Cray employee, Mr. Douglas Harless (Harless) in the Eastern District of 
Texas was one of Cray’s regular and established place of business.99 Harless 
worked as a “sales executive” for roughly seven years from his home in the 
Eastern District of Texas.100 The company’s official acknowledgement of 
                                                 
93. See Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chem, Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see 
also Javelin Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs. Ltd., No. CV 16-224-LPS, 2017 WL 5953296, at *3 (D. Del. 
Dec. 1, 2017) (holding that Cray did not alter the holding in Minnesota Mining). 
94. See Variable-Parameter Fixture Dev. Corp. v. Morpheus Lights, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 643, 644 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[V]enue [can be] established as to an individual based on [corporate] alter ego theory 
in a district with which the individual had no connection other than through the corporation.”). 
95. See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 241, 242 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) 
(“[Defendant parent company] not only completely owns [subsidiary company in the district], but 
[parent company] completely controls [the subsidiary such that it] has no ‘separate mind, will or 
existence of its own.’”) (quoting Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 
1981)). 
96. 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
97. Id. at 1357. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. Another Cray employee, Mr. Troy Testa, also lived in the Eastern District of Texas. Id. 
This was disregarded, however, because Mr. Testa only resided in the Eastern District of Texas between 
2010 and 2011, several years before Raytheon brought suit. Id. at 1364. 
100. Id. at 1357. 
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his residence, however, was limited. The only company documentation that 
provided Harless’s address was an internal document titled, “Americas 
Sales Territories” that listed him as a “Named Account Manager.”101 Cray 
neither paid for Harless’s housing nor publicly advertised his residence to 
customers.102 Cray argued that venue was improper because Harless’s 
residence did not constitute a regular and established place of business 
under § 1400(b) and filed a motion to transfer the case to the Western 
District of Wisconsin.103 
B. District Court 
In a twenty-page opinion, Federal District Court Judge Rodney Gilstrap 
denied the motion to transfer,104 analogizing the case to the Federal Circuit’s 
holding in In re Cordis Corp.105 The district court held that, because there 
was a regular and established place of business in Cordis, there was also a 
regular and established place of business in the instant case, given the 
factual similarity, therefore making venue proper.106 Accordingly, the 
motion to transfer was denied.107 
Even though he decided that Cordis was dispositive, Judge Gilstrap 
attempted to provide guidance for how to interpret the statutory language of 
§ 1400(b).108 In an effort to update the statute to the “modern era,” he laid 
out a four-factor test to determine whether there is a regular and established 
place of business, including (1) physical presence in the district,109 (2) 
defendant’s representations regarding their connection to the district,110 (3) 
the benefits received from presence in the district,111 and (4) the extent of 
the defendant’s interactions within the district.112 When applying these 
                                                 
101. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1358. 
104. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 783, 783–84 (E.D. Tex. 2017), mandamus 
granted, order vacated sub nom. In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
105. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Cordis, a Minnesota corporation sued a Florida corporation 
for patent infringement relating to the sale of implantable heart pacemakers. Id. at 734. The defendant 
employed two full-time sales representatives that were paid a salary plus commission and worked 
exclusively for the defendant. Id. at 735. 
106. Raytheon Co., 258 F. Supp. 3d at 793 (“The facts in the present case closely parallel the facts 
in Cordis.”). 
107. Id. at 799. 
108. Id. at 794 (“For the benefit of such litigants and their counsel, the Court has conducted a 
thorough analysis of the existing case law regarding regular and established place of business.”). 
109. Id. at 792 (citing Shelter-Lite Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Ohio 
1973)). 
110. Id. at 797 (citing Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. Chicago Wood Finishing Co., 180 F. 770, 771 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910)). 
111. Id. at 798 (citing Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs., Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 684, 
690 (N.D. Ill. 1977)). 
112. Id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (6th Cir. 1996)) 
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factors, no one factor should be dispositive and a judge must look at the 
totality of the circumstances.113 
Cray appealed the denial of the motion to transfer to the Federal Circuit 
through a writ of mandamus, arguing that Judge Gilstrap’s decision was a 
clear error.114 
C. Federal Circuit 
A unanimous three judge panel on the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court and held that venue was improper, thereby granting the motion 
to transfer.115 Because the district court’s four-factor test did not require a 
physical location in the given venue, the panel held this test as inconsistent 
with the statutory language.116 
The panel provided their own interpretation of the phrase “regular and 
established place of business.”117 After analyzing the legislative history and 
pertinent case law, the panel established three requirements necessary for a 
“regular and established place of business.” 
[O]ur analysis of the case law and statute reveal three general 
requirements relevant to the inquiry: (1) there must be a physical 
place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of 
business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.  If any 
statutory requirement is not satisfied, venue is improper under § 
1400(b).118 
For the first requirement, the court explained that there must always be 
a “physical, geographical location in the district from which the business of 
the defendant is carried out.”119 The court relied on the historical 
understanding of the word “place” to derive this requirement at the time of 
the original Patent Venue Statute’s enactment.120 The court used Cordis as 
an illustrative example, where the personal homes of employees were being 
used “like distribution centers.”121 
                                                 
113. Id. at 799. 
114. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357. 
115. Id. at 1366–67. The motion to transfer was granted only to the extent that venue was improper 
in the Eastern District of Texas. The Federal Circuit panel instructed the district court on remand to 
whether venue is proper, according to Cray, in the Western District of Wisconsin. Id. 
116. Id. at 1360–64 (holding that not requiring physical presence in the district would 
“impermissibly expand[] the statute”). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1360. 
119. Id. at 1362. 
120. Id. (citing Place, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891); Place, WILLIAM DWIGHT 
WHITNEY, THE CENTURY DICTIONARY 732 (Benjamin E. Smith ed., 1911)). 
121. Id. 
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For the second requirement that the fixed physical location be both 
regular and an established place of business, the court explained that the 
physical place must be both “regular” and “established.”122 Parsing the 
relevant text of the statute, the court reasoned that, 
The noun in this phrase is “place,” and “regular” and “established” 
are adjectives modifying the noun “place.” The following words, “of 
business,” indicate the nature and purpose of the “place,” and the 
preceding words, “the defendant,” indicate that it must be that of the 
defendant. Thus, § 1400(b) requires that “a defendant has” a “place 
of business” that is “regular” and “established.” All of these 
requirements must be present.123 
The court again used textual interpretation techniques with the words 
“regular” and “established” like it did with the word “place” to give them 
their ordinary, plain meaning from when the Patent Venue statute was 
initially enacted.124 
Finally, for the third requirement, the court required that the physical 
location “must be a place of the defendant, not solely a place of the 
defendant’s employee.”125 When determining if this requirement is met, the 
Federal Circuit instructed district courts to look at relevant factors such as 
(1) whether the defendant owns, leases, or exercises some possessory 
control over the relevant physical location;126 (2) whether there is a storage 
of company materials at the relevant physical location; (3) whether 
marketing, advertising, or other company representations are directed to the 
public regarding the physical location; and (4) whether the nature and 
activity of the business being conducted at the place constitutes a business 
activity.127 
Applying this newly articulated test to the facts of Cray, the court jumped 
straight to the third requirement: the physical location must belong to the 
defendant.128 The court determined from the facts presented that Harless’s 
home in the Eastern District of Texas could not be construed as “a regular 
                                                 
122. Id. at 1361–63. 
123. Id. at 1362. 
124. See id. (“A business may be ‘regular’ for example, if it operates in a ‘steady[,] uniform[,] 
orderly [, and] methodical’ manner. . . . [A] place where such business is . . . not merely temporar[y], or 
for some special work or particular transaction.”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 1363 
(“[Established] contains the root ‘stable,’ indicating . . . that the place in question must be ‘settled 
certainly, or fixed permanently.’”). 
125. Id. at 1363. 
126. Id. (noting additionally that “small business[es] might operate from a home”). 
127. In a star footnote, the court explains that this last consideration is meant to “reveal, for 
example, that a defendant has a business model whereby many employees’ homes are used by the 
business as a place of business of the defendant.” Id. at 1363–64. 
128. Id. (“The third requirement . . . is crucial here”). 
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and established place of business of Cray.”129 While warning that no single 
fact will be dispositive, the court highlighted that Cray neither had 
possession of the home in any ownership, rental, or leasing capacity, nor 
selected the location of the house, nor stored company materials in the 
home,130 nor was the location important to the business being performed by 
Harless, nor was Mr. Harless’s employment conditioned upon living in the 
Eastern District of Texas.131 Because the third requirement was not met, 
Harless’s home was held not to be a regular and established place of 
business of Cray. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Part IV assesses the accuracy with which the Federal Circuit has applied 
the historical context, legislative history, and case law around the Patent 
Venue Statute through the framework of the four categories of Patent Venue 
Statute cases. Section A looks at the effects on the Independent Sales 
Representative line of cases. Section B looks at the effects on the Traveling 
Salesman line of cases. Section C looks at the effects on the Sales Office 
line of cases. Finally, Section D explores the effects on the Parent and 
Subsidiary Corporations line of cases. 
A. The Independent Sales Representative 
In Independent Sales Representative cases, plaintiffs remain unable to 
establish proper venue in cases where persons independent of a defendant 
company distribute products in a district.132 Because the first requirement 
from the Cray elements is that there be a “fixed physical presence,”133 this 
scenario fails. To the extent that there were exceptional cases where the 
defendant had a high degree of control over an independent contractor in 
the district,134 those cases will have difficulty meeting the second and third 
requirements.135 
                                                 
129. Id. 
130. The court rejected Raytheon’s argument that this should not matter because “Cray did not 
need to store business material with Mr. Harless . . . because many were available online.” Id. at 1364. 
131. The court then contrasts these facts with the facts of Cordis, where Cordis established the 
place of business, depended on the employees to be physically in the district, and that Cordis 
“affirmatively acted to make permanent operations within that district to service the customers there.” 
Id. at 1365. 
132. CHISUM, supra note 68, § 21.02[2][d][iii]. 
133. See supra note 105. 
134. See supra note 69. 
135. See Nike, Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-007-PK, 2017 WL 7275389, at *7 (D. 
Or. Nov. 14, 2017) (noting that “the distinction between employees and independent sales 
representatives is not crucial” because of how few sales the independent representative made); Patent 
Holder LLC v. Lone Wolf Distrib., Inc., No. 17-23060-CIV, 2017 WL 5032989, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:395 
 
 
 
In post-Cray cases, the most common variant of the category has been 
plaintiffs attempting to tie third-party distribution centers in the district to 
defendant corporations. So far, district courts have unanimously refused to 
find venue proper because these places fail to meet the Cray’s third 
requirement.136 
B. The Traveling Salesman 
For Traveling Salesman cases, the first of Cray’s three requirements—
that there be a physical location137—and the third requirement—that the 
physical location belong to the defendant138—are the most important. For 
the first requirement, in the typical factual scenario where a salesman has 
no physical office and lives outside of the district in which he is soliciting 
sales,139 venue is still not satisfied.140 Because the salesman is working for 
a corporation in this factual category,141 a plaintiff must bring suit in the 
state of incorporation.142 
Through the third requirement, the Shelter-Lite line of cases143 has 
remained extremely narrow. Those decisions allowed for a finding of 
regular and established place of business for an outside corporation whose 
traveling salesman lives inside the district under limited circumstances.144 
This is the factual scenario Cray falls under.145 Cray’s third requirement of 
the Cray analysis is that the physical location must belong to the defendant; 
in other words, the third requirement says that property can neither be 
                                                 
1, 2017) (“Even assuming that certain dealers sell Lone Wolf products in the District, any such physical 
place would be legally insufficient to support venue because that physical place would not belong to 
Lone Wolf.”); Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 599, 611 (N.D. Tex. 
2017) (finding venue improper, in part, because “none of the sales representatives identified in the record 
are Teva USA employees” despite Teva USA “exercis[ing] significant control over” sales 
representatives). 
136. See CAO Lighting, Inc. v. Light Efficient Design, No. 4:16-CV-00482-DCN, 2017 WL 
4556717, at *2–3 (D. Idaho Oct. 11, 2017); SportPet Designs Inc. v. Cat1st Corp., No. 17-CV-0554, 
2018 WL 1157925, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 2, 2018); Hildebrand v. Wilmar Corp., No. 17-CV-02821-
PAB-MEH, 2018 WL 1535505, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2018); Wet Sounds, Inc. v. PowerBass USA, 
Inc., No. CV H-17-3258, 2018 WL 1811354, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2018); EMED Techs. Corp. v. 
Repro-Med Sys., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-728-WCB-RSP, 2018 WL 2544564, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 
2018). 
137. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359. 
138. Id. 
139. See supra note 80. 
140. CHISUM, supra note 67, § 21.02[2][d][iii]. 
141. See supra Section II.B. 
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400. 
143. See supra notes 75–77. 
144. See supra note 78. 
145. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1356–58. 
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owned exclusively by the third-party salesman, nor can an defendant 
corporation’s employee own and exercise exclusive control over it.146 
However, Cray did leave the door open for a situation where a 
corporation has some property interest in the salesman’s residence.147 In 
Regenlab USA LLC v. Estar Tech. Ltd.,148 defendant Eclipse Aesthetics 
LLC (Eclipse) was held to have a regular and established place of business 
in the Southern District of New York through the home offices of two 
employees.149 Distinguishing Cray, the court found that the employees’ 
home offices were “of the defendant”150 because Eclipse ran public 
advertisements for sales people in the district, preferred that the New York 
sales people live in the area, and the employees performed product 
demonstrations for customers in New York.151 But for the most part, 
however, district courts applying Cray’s test have found the third 
requirement lacking for salesmen living in the district.152 
C. The Sales Office 
Despite Cray’s declaration that “each case depends on its own facts,”153 
the facts deemed important in Cray are those that are given weight in future 
decisions. Similarly, although the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray cannot 
alter the Supreme Court precedent established by Tyler,154 it guides which 
Tyler facts district courts now consider determinative and which Tyler facts 
district courts consider less significant. 
                                                 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1365. The Cray court noted that the residence could not be owned by the defendant 
Cray, Inc. because 
There is no indication that Cray owns, leases, or rents any portion of Mr. Harless’s home in the 
Eastern District of Texas. No evidence indicates that Cray played a part in selecting the place’s 
location, stored inventory or conducted demonstrations there, or conditioned Mr. Harless or 
Mr. Testa’s employment or support on the maintenance of an Eastern District of Texas location. 
Id. 
148. No. 16-CV-08771 (ALC), 2018 WL 3910823 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2018). 
149. Id. at *14, *17. 
150. Id. at *16. (quoting Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363). 
151. Id. at *16–17 (“[W]hen Eclipse products arrive at a customer’s home, the employee uses the 
products stored in their home office to conduct demonstrations. This again contrasts with In re Cray, 
whose forum state-based employees did not store any inventory or conduct demonstrations in the state, 
or serve any customers in the district.”). 
152. E.g., BillingNetwork Patent, Inc. v. Modernizing Med., Inc., No. 17 C 5636, 2017 WL 
5146008, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2017); Niazi v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., No. 17-CV-183-JDP, 2017 
WL 5159784, at *3–5 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2017); Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Free-Flow 
Packaging Int’l, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-2022, 2018 WL 400326, at *6–10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2018); Green 
Fitness Equip. Co., LLC v. Precor Inc., No. 18-CV-00820-JST, 2018 WL 3207967, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. 
June 29, 2018); VoIP-Pal.com, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-002338-RFB-CWH, 2018 WL 
3543031, at *2–4 (D. Nev. July 23, 2018). 
153. Id. at 1362. 
154. See supra notes 83–91. 
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First, whether the sales office has authority to bind the defendant155 will 
now be of little significance. In Cray, Harless had full authority to sell, but 
this was disregarded.156 Therefore, the line of cases following Tyler that are 
determinative on this fact157 have greatly reduced significance, if not 
effectively overruled. 
Second, the frequency of sales becomes a highly relevant fact.158 Because 
the Federal Circuit defines “regular” as “steady[,] uniform[,] orderly[, and] 
methodical,” a single, or very few, infringing sale will rarely, if ever, satisfy 
this piece of the second requirement.159 
On a broader note, district courts have taken a narrow definition of what 
qualifies as a place of business for the second requirement, asking whether 
business is occurring from the disputed location.160 This question has 
created a split at the district court level. In Pers. Audio, LLC v. Google, 
Inc.,161 the Eastern District of Texas held that the Google Global Cache 
(GGC) servers were not a place of business.162 The court declined to rule 
that the server’s function of connecting users to the internet because it would 
inappropriately broaden the scope of the state.163 Then in Seven Networks, 
LLC v. Google LLC,164 also in the Eastern District of Texas, the court held 
that the same GGC servers do meet the second requirement, and that venue 
was proper.165 The Seven Networks court explained that requiring the 
presence of a person for a regular and established place of business to exist 
would be against the text of the statute and Congressional intent, and 
                                                 
155. Id. at 725. 
156. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1366. 
157. See supra note 83. 
158. Tyler, 236 U.S. at 725. 
159. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362 (internal quotations omitted); see also Nike, 2017 WL 7275389, at 
*7 (“It is relevant that the three independent sales representatives made only a few sales compared to 
Defendant’s sales in other states through its brick-and-mortar stores.”); supra note 31 (showing that 
there is no recognized nexus requirement between the “regular and established place of business” 
requirement and the “acts of infringement” requirement of § 1400(b)). 
160. See Peerless Network, Inc. v. Blitz Telecom Consulting, LLC, No. 17-CV-1725 (JPO), 2018 
WL 1478047, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2018) (declining to treat defendant’s telecommunication 
equipment as a place of business because the defendant “direct[s] telecommunications traffic through 
New York, but they do not engage in business from the shelf itself”); CDx Diagnostic, Inc. v. United 
States Endoscopy Grp., Inc., No. 13-CV-5669 (NSR), 2018 WL 2388534, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 
2018) (declining to treat storage units as a place of business because employees because business was 
conducted from the units). 
161. 280 F. Supp. 3d 922 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
162. Id. at 934. (“It might be true that part of Google’s business relies on these servers, but that 
does not amount to Google’s business being carried out from them.”) (emphasis added). 
163. Id. (“To conclude that Google’s business was being carried out by these servers would have 
far-reaching consequences that distort the scope of the statute; for example, every single AT&T tower 
would then possibly become a place of business for AT&T. Maybe even every handheld device sold by 
Verizon would become a place of business for Verizon because the end-user signed an agreement with 
Verizon regarding Verizon’s exclusive control of the device.”). 
164. No. 2:17-CV-00442-JRG, 2018 WL 3634589 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2018). 
165. Id. at *21. 
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therefore disregards that objection from the defendant,166 holding that this 
would not constitute an impermissibly overbroad reading of the Patent 
Venue Statute. If this split persists in the district courts, the Federal Circuit 
will need to step in and clarify what qualifies as a place of business for the 
purposes of the Patent Venue Statute. Given the narrow reading of § 1400(b) 
in Cray, the court is likely to agree with the narrower reading of Pers. Audio. 
Third, whether the office space is shared with another corporation 
decreases in significance.167 This fact relates closest to the third requirement 
that that the fixed physical location belongs to the defendant.168 The court 
stated, in the context of a residence for one of its employees, that even such 
attenuated factors as conditions for employment, leasing, or “other 
attributes of possession or control over the place” can suffice to treat a 
physical establishment as being “of the defendant” for venue purposes.169 
Relatedly, the court emphasized that both marketing and advertising were 
important factors to the extent that the corporation is holding itself out to 
the public as having a regular and established place of business at said 
location.170 Accordingly, any form of possession or control over a physical 
location, if extensive enough, is necessary as a threshold matter to meet the 
third requirement, even when another person or legal entity concurrently 
possesses or controls the identified physical location.171 
Fourth and finally, whether expenses were shared by another company 
will not have great relevance for a similar reason the third Tyler fact did not 
have a substantial impact in Cray: total control over the physical location is 
not necessary to satisfy the third requirement.172 The corporation’s 
representation of the physical location to the public is important once some 
                                                 
166. See id. at *18–19 (citing § 18(c) from the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat 284, 331 (2011), which exempted Automated Teller Machines from being regular and 
established places of business to support the holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) cannot be read to require 
a place of business to have a corporation’s employee present). Contra Peerless, 2018 WL 1478047, at * 
(stating that that regular and established place of business requirement of 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) “requires 
some employee or agent of the defendant to be conducting business at the location in question”). 
167. Tyler, 236 U.S. at 725. 
168. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1360. 
169. Id. at 1363 (“Relevant considerations include whether the defendant owns or leases the place, 
or exercises other attributes of possession or control over the place. One can also recognize that a small 
business might operate from a home; if that is a place of business of the defendant, that can be a place 
of business satisfying the requirement of the statute.”). 
170. Id. (“Marketing or advertisements also may be relevant, but only to the extent they indicate 
that the defendant itself holds out a place for its business.”). 
171. See Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., No. 6:17-CV-00170-RWS, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79068, at *15–25 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018) (finding the third requirement of Cray met because 
defendants paid third parties retailers for premium product placement in their stores and exercised 
control over the space by monitoring sales data, employing agents to visit the store and inspect the 
product placement, and reporting back about the placement). 
172. See supra notes 125–27. 
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possessory interest has been established.173 A sharing of expenses in Tyler 
would likely satisfy this requirement from Cray.  
D. The Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 
The factual scenario of Cray provides little guidance for this category. 
However, the explanation of the third requirement demonstrates the effect 
of Cray for future parent and subsidiary scenarios in an important way: how 
the company holds itself out can still override a legal separation between 
the entities to establish venue.174 Just as marketing and advertising can 
render a place “of the defendant,”175 a company whose wholly-owned 
subsidiary uses marketing and advertising to hold itself out as conducting 
business at a certain location would render a finding of proper venue even 
if it is formally owned by a subsidiary.176 
Bd. of Regents v. Medtronic PLC177 demonstrates that this exception 
exists post-Cray. In Medtronic, a building owned by MiniMed, a subsidiary 
of defendant Medtronic, Inc. (Medtronic), was held to be Medtronic’s 
regular and established place of business for venue purposes.178 The court 
reached this conclusion because Medtronic placed its logo on the building 
and issued a press release.179 But without this breakdown of formal 
separation, post-Cray decisions have adhered to the pre-Cray precedent180 
of denying venue to plaintiffs who only allege a corporate defendant’s 
subsidiary in the district.181 
CONCLUSION 
After more than a thirty-year gap182 in case law on the phrase “regular 
and established place of business” because of the VE Holding decision,183 
the Supreme Court reversed well-established Federal Circuit precedent and 
                                                 
173. See supra notes 165–67. 
174. CHISUM, supra note 67, § 21.02[2][d][ii]. 
175. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1363. 
176. See supra notes 100–01. 
177. No. A-17-CV-0942-LY, 2018 WL 2353788 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 2018). 
178. Id. at *2–3. 
179. Id. 
180. See supra Section II.D. 
181. E.g., Symbology, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 931–33; Soverain IP, LLC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-
00293-RWS-RSP, 2017 WL 5126158, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2017); Galderma Labs., 290 F. Supp. 
3d at 610–12; Infinity Comput. Prods., Inc. v. OKI Data Americas, Inc., No. CV 12-6797, 2018 WL 
1035793, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018); Unity Opto Tech. Co. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC, No. 
18-CV-27-JDP, 2018 WL 2087250, at *2–3 (W.D. Wis. May 4, 2018) (declining to impugn physical 
location of parent company to two defendant subsidiaries). 
182. See supra note 70. 
183. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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created a need to clarify the conflicting case law184 without providing 
guidance on how to revive this once-extinct rule of civil procedure. In In re 
Cray, the Federal Circuit began to fill this gap in jurisprudence, almost 
always serving as the dispositive issue when determining whether venue is 
proper. 
This three-part requirement from Cray is consistent with the original 
nineteenth-century purpose of the Patent Venue Statute in its efforts to 
tighten the scope of possible venue locations compared to the General 
Venue Statute.185 Where Cray conflicts with prior case law, it conflicts only 
to the extent that there was a preexisting conflict between competing 
precedent.186 And in most situations, the Federal Circuit resolved the 
conflict on the side of a narrower reading. So far, the district courts applying 
Cray’s test have largely followed a narrow reading. Moving forward, Cray 
and its early progeny provide a coherent roadmap for the factual scenarios 
likely to trigger a litigation-worthy venue question. Plaintiffs now have 
more limited circumstances allowing them to litigate in federal judicial 
district(s) outside the defendant’s state of incorporation. 
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit will need more cases—both from itself 
and district courts—to fully implement their narrow reading of the Patent 
Venue Statute. But Cray, read in light of prior jurisprudence, provides a 
strong framework moving forward and puts patent owners on notice that 
their desired venue may no longer be as easily accessible as before.
David A. Serati* 
 
 
 
                                                 
184. See generally supra Part II. 
185. See supra Section I.C.3. 
186. See supra notes 135–56 (demonstrating that given a choice whether to interpret a Tyler fact 
narrowly or broadly, the federal circuit chose to read the narrow interpretation). 
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